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The globalization process has tightened ﬁnancial and commercial linkages among economies. An
element of this process has been a large increase in private ﬁnancial ﬂows across countries. For
instance, a number of studies have documented that cross border ﬁnancial claims and direct foreign
investment have experienced a signiﬁcant growth in the last two decades (Kose et al., 2006) and,
according to the IMF, the amount of net private capital ﬂowing to emerging economies increased
from 90 billion U.S. dollars in 2002 to 600 billion in 2007 (IMF, 2010).
In general, capital inﬂows to emerging economies yield several beneﬁts for the recipient economies
(Bosworth and Collins, 1999). Among the most important, they allow economies with insuﬃcient
savings to have access to external resources in order to ﬁnance investment and promote growth.
However, large surges of capital ﬂows also pose signiﬁcant challenges to the recipient countries.
Apart from the concerns about excessive appreciation and unsustainable credit expansions, there is
a risk of a sudden reversal in capital ﬂows, with negative consequences for both ﬁnancial stability
and economic activity.
Emerging economies have often been subject to sharp reversals in capital ﬂows, which sometimes
reﬂect global factors such as sudden shifts in market sentiment among international investors, and
sometimes reﬂect domestic factors, such as weak economic fundamentals in the recipient economies.
Eﬀectively, empirical evidence has shown that such reversals, known as “sudden stops” in the eco-
nomic literature, have had an adverse impact on domestic economies (Calvo, 1998). In particular,
such reversals in foreign ﬁnancing force sharp contractions of domestic expenditure and production,
real exchange rate depreciations, and reductions in both asset prices and credit to the private sector
(Arellano and Mendoza, 2002).
During the international ﬁnancial crisis, the sudden increase in risk aversion among market par-
ticipants following the events of September 2008, along with the deleveraging process in developed
economies, led to a period of lesser access to international ﬁnancial markets for emerging economies.
This reversion in ﬁnancial ﬂows, coupled with a reduced demand for these economies’ exports, neg-
atively aﬀected economic activity in emerging markets. After the sharp contraction of ﬁnancial
ﬂows in late 2008 and early 2009, from mid-2009 onwards signiﬁcantly loose liquidity conditions in
the global economy, and better economic perspectives in emerging markets, contributed to a new
episode of massive capital ﬂows to these economies. This surge has raised concerns in the recipient
economies. In particular, there are worries that these capital inﬂows could suddenly reverse. This
could take place when the advanced economies start to withdraw the monetary stimulus, or when
an e we p i s o d eo fﬁnancial stress raises the level of uncertainty and risk aversion and therefore
induces capital to move to safer places, suddenly aﬀecting capital inﬂows to emerging economies.
Indeed, since the beginning of august 2011, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe has led to a period
of considerable stress in international ﬁnancial markets. As a result, there has been some reversal
of capital ﬂows in emerging markets. In this context, although a scenario of a sudden stop has not
yet materialized, the probability of it happening has signiﬁcantly increased.
In this setting, an important issue for emerging economies’ policymakers is how to respond to
1a sudden halt of external ﬁnancing and its negative consequences for the domestic economy. In
particular, the circumstances under which the authorities would be able to implement expansionary
policies, such as loosening monetary conditions and ﬁscal stimulus packages, to attenuate the ad-
verse impact on economic activity. Using data for 104 countries for the period 1960-2003, Kamisky,
Reinhart and Vegh (2004) found evidence that in emerging and developing economies, episodes of
capital outﬂows are associated with contractionary macroeconomic policies and episodes of capital
inﬂows with expansionary macroeconomic policies. These authors document that both monetary
and ﬁscal policies tend to be procyclical in these economies, specially in times of ﬁnancial stress,
which exacerbates the output contraction. In the case of monetary policy, during a period of capital
outﬂows it was a common practice among central banks in emerging economies to raise the policy
rate in order to defend a ﬁxed exchange rate (Kaminsky et al. 2004). As for procyclicality of
ﬁscal policy, in an environment of weak institutions, Lane and Tornell (1999) and Frankel (2011)
document that governments are usually not able to resist the political pressures to increase public
spending, some times more than proportionately, during economic expansions. In turn, when for-
eign ﬁnancing disappears, they are typically forced to follow contractionary ﬁscal policies. These
procyclical macroeconomic policies tend to exacerbate output volatility instead of moderating it
(Frankel, 2011).
However, during the recent ﬁnancial crisis a number of emerging economies, specially those
that have adopted sound monetary and ﬁscal policies in the years prior to the crisis, were able to
implement countercyclical macroeconomic policies. Thus, the experience of these economies during
the recent crisis suggests that economies with relatively strong fundamentals enjoyed more space
to provide monetary and ﬁscal stimulus. In this context, the crisis reinforced the idea that an
economy that follows prudent macroeconomic policies in normal times tends to be in a relatively
better position to cope with the adverse consequences of a crisis (Fisher, 2011). More generally,
improved institutional frameworks built in normal times may be the key to reduce the procyclicality
of macroeconomic policies, and to increase the room to follow countercyclical policies in times of
distress.
In order to address the above issues, this paper develops a small-scale macroeconomic model of
the New Keynesian type, which incorporates the possibility of a sudden reversal in capital ﬂows as
well as a ﬁscal policy rule. This model provides a simple analytical framework to get some insights
regarding those factors that tend to increase policymakers’ degrees of freedom to respond to adverse
external shocks, such as a “sudden stop” in foreign ﬁnancing. Numerical exercises illustrate how
the margin of maneuver to cope with negative shocks depends crucially on the levels of credibility
that monetary and ﬁscal authorities enjoy, as well as on the initial conditions of the economy when
the shock hits.
In the case of monetary policy, a credible central bank’s compromise to maintain an environment
of price stability over time increases the degrees of freedom to use monetary policy to ameliorate the
negative impact on output. In particular, if there is no commitment or capacity by the monetary
authority to maintain inﬂation low and stable, then loosening monetary policy may raise concerns
2about inﬂation, which then, possibly by rising inﬂation expectations, could eventually generate
high inﬂation rates. This constrains the role that monetary policy can play in response to adverse
external shocks. On the contrary, if the central bank’s compromise is credible, and if this is reﬂected
in a smaller pass-through from a nominal depreciation to the inﬂation rate, as for instance authors
such as Taylor (2000) have argued, then the monetary authority may be able to implement larger
policy cuts without signiﬁcant worries about a further deterioration in the inﬂation outlook.
As for ﬁscal policy, it is also crucial to follow sound policies over time. That is, weak ﬁscal
accounts and large public debt levels can signiﬁcantly constrain policymakers’ capacity to imple-
ment ﬁscal stimulus packages. Under these circumstances, an expansionary ﬁscal policy can raise
concerns about the long-term sustainability of public ﬁnances, which may have a negative impact
on ﬁnancial conditions. What is needed is an institutional framework that would induce authori-
ties to save the extraordinary revenues associated with economic expansions, in order to use them
during economic downturns. For instance, a higher degree of transparency in ﬁscal management
would make those authorities in charge of ﬁscal policy more accountable, and may reduce the in-
ﬂuence of interest groups on the allocation of public sector resources. This may help to reduce
the procyclicality of ﬁscal policy and increase the room to adopt countercyclical policies (Cuadra
and Sapriza, 2011, Cuadra et al. 2010). An example of a ﬁscal policy framework that can allow
authorities to implement a countercyclical policy without raising worries about the sustainability
of ﬁscal accounts may be a structural balance ﬁscal rule.
Apart from the above issues, another factor that also inﬂuences the space to provide economic
stimulus are the conditions prevailing in the domestic economy at the time a sudden reversal of
foreign ﬁnancial ﬂows takes place. For instance, an initial inﬂation rate above the central bank’s
target can severely limit the monetary authority’s margin of maneuver to relax the monetary policy
stance to prevent a drop in output related to an abrupt loss of access to international ﬁnancial
markets. Clearly, under an economic environment characterized by an inﬂa t i o nr a t ei nl i n ew i t h
price stability (or a country’s inﬂation target), central banks have more degrees of freedom to
respond more aggressively, or at least to adopt a less restrictive monetary policy.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the experience of emerging
economies during the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Section 3 presents a small scale model with an external
risk premium and a ﬁscal policy rule. Section 4 analyzes a number of exercises using this model
and provides some insights about the policy response to external shocks. Section 5 presents the
ﬁnal remarks.
2 The Financial Crisis
Emerging market economies entered the recent international ﬁnancial crisis with diﬀerent initial
conditions (Ghosh et al. 2009). For instance, there are a number of economies, mainly in Asia
and some in Latin America, which in the decade before the crisis had substantially improved their
macroeconomic policy frameworks with sound ﬁscal and monetary policies, ﬂexible exchange rate
3regimes, sustainable external accounts and, in many cases, large holdings of international reserves
(BID, 2008). In some cases, favorable terms of trade in that period also helped considerably to
strengthen these economies’ fundamentals.
As for macroeconomic policies, prudent ﬁscal policy management in some countries helped to
eliminate the large and persistent budget deﬁcits that many of these economies had experienced
in the past. This also contributed to reduce the public debt to GDP ratio in these economies.
Moreover, since the decade of the 1990s several emerging economies abandoned ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes. Instead, they adopted monetary policy frameworks oriented to achieve price stability. For
instance, some economies introduced an inﬂation targeting regime. These frameworks, along with
ﬁscal policy discipline, helped to reduce inﬂation and its volatility, as well as to anchor inﬂation
expectations.1
Under these circumstances, it can be argued that when the crisis ﬁrst emerged in 2007, these
economies were in a relatively better position to deal with an adverse external environment than
in previous ﬁnancial crises and recessions. Unfortunately, progress in improving macroeconomic
policy frameworks and, more generally, economic fundamentals, was not a generalized phenomenon.
For instance, prior to the crisis some emerging countries, especially in Eastern Europe, experienced
un-sustainable private credit booms, usually fueled by external ﬁnancing, that led to both huge
debt levels and foreign currency exposures on their domestic balance sheets, making them highly
vulnerable to capital outﬂows (Ghosh et al. 2009).
Although the recent ﬁnancial crisis aﬀected most emerging market economies, for instance
practically all of them faced tighter conditions to access external ﬁnancing, the most aﬀected
countries were those with the worst economic fundamentals. For example, Figure 1 illustrates
that those countries with higher inﬂation rates and larger current account deﬁcits before the crisis
tended to experience a greater widening in sovereign risk indicators following the sharp increase in
uncertainty in mid-September 2008.
Hence, although the crisis was triggered by external factors, the severity of the impact of the
shocks on each economy seems to be related, to some extent, to domestic elements. For instance, in
light of the sharp rise in risk aversion among international investors, the larger the current account
deﬁcit, the more likely external accounts would be perceived as unsustainable, leading also to a
more severe adverse eﬀect. In the same way, the higher the domestic inﬂation the more likely market
participants would lose conﬁdence in the value of the domestic currency, which would intensify the
negative impact.
It seems that market participants discriminated among economies and penalized more those that
were in worse shape at that time. Thise v i d e n c ei sc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h eﬁndings of Rangel and Ramos-
Francia (2011) and Llaudes et al. (2010). Controlling for a number of factors, these authors ﬁnd
that those countries considered less externally vulnerable in 2007 suﬀered a less dramatic increase
in sovereign spreads than countries regarded as more vulnerable. For instance, inﬂation targeting
economies with a lower cumulative inﬂation in the years before the crisis tended to experience a
1See Capistrán and Ramos-Francia (2009 and 2010).
4smaller increase in spreads.
It is also clear that those countries that have created a sound macroeconomic framework based
on ﬁscal and monetary discipline were the ones that were able to respond more aggressively to the
external shocks. In particular, it seems that policymakers in countries with weak fundamentals
had less room to provide either ﬁscal or monetary stimulus. In the case of monetary policy, Figure
2 shows that those countries with low inﬂation rates and small current account deﬁcits seem to
have responded more aggressively. In particular, they implemented larger policy cuts during the
two quarters after the events of September 2008. As for the ﬁscal policy, Figure 3 illustrates that
economies with stronger ﬁscal positions and lower public debt levels appear to have been able to
provide more ﬁscal stimulus.
Based on the above considerations, it seems that initial conditions were an important factor in
explaining why some economies were relatively less aﬀected by the crisis, were able to implement
countercyclical policies, or both. More generally, it can be argued that better macroeconomic
policy frameworks in a number of economies increased the level of credibility of the monetary and
ﬁscal authorities. As a result, at the time the crisis hit these economies, policymakers enjoyed
more degrees of freedom to stimulate the economy. In the next sections, these issues are illustrated
through a number of numerical exercises with a small-scale macroeconomic model, which helps to
rationalize emerging economies’ experience during the recent crisis.
3 The Model
This section describes the small-scale New Keynesian model used in this paper. It corresponds to
the type of models termed “hybrid”, which include both forward- and backward-looking elements,
and it is similar to that used by Sidaoui and Ramos-Francia (2008).2 However, the model in this
paper incorporates the possibility of a sudden reversal in capital ﬂows, as well as a ﬁscal policy
rule.
As previously mentioned, the lesser access to external ﬁnancing associated with “sudden stop”
episodes, entails a sharp contraction in domestic absorption and output, and triggers a depreciation
of the real exchange rate. These episodes can be driven either by domestic factors, such as weak
fundamentals, or global factors, such as an increase in risk aversion among international investors.
The model assumes that the trigger is a deterioration in market participants’ sentiment, which is
reﬂected in a sharp increase in the risk premium. That is, the reversal in capital ﬂo w si si n c o r po r a t e d
as a shock to the risk premium, and it is consequently an exogenous event.3
The model consists of ﬁve behavioral equations an one identity: a Phillips curve for inﬂation
(equation (1)); an IS equation for the output gap (equation (2)); an uncovered interest rate parity
2It is now customary to add lagged variables to New Keynesian models, usually to improve their ﬁtt ot h ed a t a .
“Hybrid” New Keynesian models can be found in Adolfson et al. (2008); Christiano et al. (2005); Del Negro et al.
(2007); Galí and Gertler (1999); Galí et al. (2005) and Rudd and Whelan (2006), among others.
3Similarly, Gomez (2004) includes this type of shock in a gap model to analyze the “fear of ﬂoating” phenomenon
under inﬂation targeting.
5condition for the nominal exchange rate (equation (3)); a Taylor-type rule for the nominal interest
rate (equation (4)); a structural balance ﬁs c a lr u l e( e q u a t i o n( 5 ) ) ;a n da ni d e n t i t yf o rt h er e a l
exchange rate (equation (6)). Finally, the dynamics in the model are driven by a risk premium
shock that follows an (1) process (equation (7)). It should be noted that this is a gap model
where lowercase letters indicate percentage deviations from steady state values:
 = 1−1 + 2 (+1)+3 + 4 ( − −1) (1)
 = 1−1 + 2 (+1) − 3 ( −  (+1)) + 4 − 5 − 6 (2)
 =  (+1)+∗
 +  −  (3)
 = −1 + 2 + 3 (4)
 =  (5)
 ≡ −1 +(  − −1) −  + ∗
 (6)
 = −1 +  (7)
where,  is the inﬂation rate, ∗ the external inﬂation rate,  is the output gap,  is the nominal
exchange rate,  is the real exchange rate,  is the nominal interest rate, ∗ is the external nominal
interest rate,  is the risk premium, and  is the ﬁscal balance. Notice that in this model trend
inﬂation is assumed to be constant and equal to zero, which can be interpreted as the result of a
successful inﬂation targeting central bank with an inﬂation target equal to zero.
In the model, the risk premium shock aﬀects the economy through the following channels:
1. An increase in the risk premium triggers a nominal exchange rate depreciation (equation
(3)). In turn, a higher level of the nominal exchange rate tends to increase the inﬂation rate
(equation (1)). The pass-through from the nominal exchange rate to inﬂation depends on the
value of 4, which is assumed to be positive and lower than one.
2. Since there is not a complete pass-through from the nominal exchange rate to inﬂation, there
is also a depreciation in real terms (equation (6)). In turn, the real exchange depreciation
tends to increase the output gap (equation (2)). This positive eﬀect can be rationalized by
assuming that the change in relative prices associated with the real depreciation boosts net
exports, which has a favorable impact on economic activity. The increase in output generates
inﬂationary pressures (equation (1)).
3. There is also a direct negative eﬀect of the risk premium shock on the output gap (equation
(2)). Given the sudden increase in the cost of foreign ﬁnancing, it can be argued that domestic
agents have to adjust their spending patterns, which negatively aﬀects output. In fact, a
number of studies have documented a negative correlation between economic activity and
sovereign risk indicators (e.g., Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006). By depressing
economic activity, the risk premium shock exerts downward pressures on inﬂation.
In principle, depending on which of the above eﬀects dominates, an increase in the risk premium
6can lead to diﬀerent outcomes, such as inﬂation and a negative output gap, deﬂation and a negative
output gap, and even inﬂation and a positive output gap.
As for the ﬁscal policy, the government follows a structural balance ﬁscal rule. Following Medina
and Soto (2007), the structural balance (SFB) is deﬁned as the ﬁscal balance minus the cyclical
ﬁscal income. The latter is the diﬀerence between the observed ﬁscal revenues and those revenues
corresponding to the economy being at its potential level:4
 =  − e 
e  =  ( − )
The uppercase letters  and  represent the levels of current output and potential output,
respectively. According to this rule, ﬁscal authorities run a balanced structural budget over the
business cycle. This implies a surplus (deﬁcit) in ﬁscal accounts whenever the output gap is positive
(negative):
 =0 
 =  ( − )
Given the structural balance ﬁscal rule, a negative (positive) output gap leads to a deﬁcit
(surplus) in the ﬁscal accounts. In turn, a ﬁscal deﬁcit, which is associated with an expansionary
ﬁscal policy, has a positive impact on economic activity (equation (2)).5 I tc a nb ea r g u e dt h a ta
parameterization with the ﬁscal balance, , equal to zero can be interpreted as an economy where
authorities keep a balanced budget over the business cycle, which would correspond to a balanced
ﬁscal budget rule (or, equivalently in this model, a 6 equal to zero).
The values of the parameters use in the numerical exercises fulﬁll the following criteria: ﬁrst,
the parameter values in this paper are similar to those used in the economic literature (Galí 2008,
Sidaoui and Ramos-Francia 2008). Thus, they are in line with empirical studies and consequently
have economic sense. Second, the parameters of the Phillips curve and the IS equation used in
this paper are chosen such that an increase in the risk premium triggers a nominal exchange rate
depreciation, an increase in inﬂation, and a negative output gap. Third, they satisfy the Blanchard-
Khan conditions when the numerical exercises imply modifying the value of one parameter. Finally,
it is worth mentioning that the aim is to perform numerical exercises to get insights about those
factors that increase policymakers’ margin of maneuver to respond to shocks, rather than calibrate
the model to a speciﬁc economy. Table 1 shows the parameter values used in this paper.
Figure 4 depicts the dynamics of the model. Consider an initial situation where the economy
is at its steady state, with an output gap equal to zero and inﬂation equal to the central bank’s
objective (zero in this model). Then, a sudden increase in the risk premium hits the economy.
4For simplicity it is assumed that potential output coincides with the steady state level of output. For the same
reason, the tax rate is assumed to be ﬁxed.
5It is implicitly assumed that a ﬁscal policy framework based on this rule, allows authorities to run a ﬁscal deﬁcit
in bad times without raising concerns about the long-run sustainability of ﬁscal accounts.
7This shock leads to a nominal depreciation, which tends to move inﬂation above the target. At
the same time, the incomplete pass-through from the nominal exchange rate to inﬂation leads to a
depreciation in real terms.
Although it is assumed that a real exchange rate depreciation has a favorable eﬀect on economic
activity, the negative direct eﬀect of the risk premium dominates the positive eﬀect through the
real exchange rate. As a result, there is a contraction in output. The central bank responds by
loosening monetary conditions. However, given the initial hike in inﬂation, the initial policy rate
cut is moderate. Later, the severe output contraction exerts downward pressures on inﬂation. In
t h i sw a y ,t h ed r o pi ni n ﬂation allows the monetary authority to implement a further reduction in
the policy rate. Both inﬂation and the output gap overshoot their initial values, and ﬁnally all
variables tend to converge to the steady state.
4 Policy Response to Sudden Reversals in Capital Inﬂows
In this section a number of numerical exercises are performed in order to illustrate how credible
monetary and ﬁscal policy frameworks, as well as favorable initial conditions, can facilitate the
adoption of countercyclical policies.
4.1 Experiment 1: Credible Monetary Policy
This section uses the baseline model to illustrate how a more credible central bank enjoys more
degrees of freedom to respond to the adverse eﬀects related to an episode of a sudden reversal in
capital ﬂows, and the corresponding increase in risk premium. The case of a monetary authority
with a high degree of credibility may be characterized by an economy with a lower pass-through
from the nominal exchange rate to inﬂation than in the baseline scenario.
In open economies, the exchange rate may aﬀect inﬂation though diﬀerent channels. First,
economic agents consume not only domestically produced goods and services but also imported
goods. To the extent that the latter are included in the consumer price index, there will be a direct
eﬀect of the exchange rate to the inﬂation rate. Second, in many cases imported intermediated
goods are used to produce domestic goods. Thus, ﬂuctuations in the nominal exchange rate can
aﬀect the inﬂation rate through changes in the price of these intermediated goods. These can be
interpreted as the ﬁrst round eﬀect of movements in the exchange rate on inﬂation.
However, apart from the above eﬀects, if the central bank’s commitment to price stability is
not credible and inﬂation expectations are not well anchored, a nominal depreciation may also
inﬂuence domestic prices and thus inﬂation through second round eﬀects. That is, if economic
agents do not trust the monetary authority’s compromise to maintain an inﬂation rate in line with
p r i c es t a b i l i t y( o rw i t hi t st a r g e t ,i nc a s ei th a so n e )t h e n ,g i v e nt h er i s ei np r i c e sd u et oﬁrst round
eﬀects, they may revise their inﬂation expectations upwards, leading to a widespread rise in prices
and consequently to higher inﬂation levels.
In this context, it can be argued that the higher the degree of central bank’s credibility, the lower
8the persistence of inﬂation and the lower the pass-though (Taylor, 2000). In fact, the decrease in the
pass-through in developed economies in the last two decades and more recently in some emerging
economies, has been attributed by some authors to the adoption of more stable and predictable
monetary policies around the world (Mishkin, 2008).
In this section, an economy without pass-through is regarded as an economy with a fully credible
monetary authority. Figure 5 illustrates the impact of the risk premium shock on inﬂation, output
gap and real exchange rate, as well as the monetary policy response, for both the baseline model
and the model without pass-trough. In the latter, the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate
does not lead to a rebound of inﬂation. In fact, inﬂation falls due to the contractionary impact of
the adverse risk premium shock. As for the output gap, the initial drop in economic activity is less
severe in the case of the model without pass-through. In particular, given the nominal depreciation,
the lower inﬂation leads to a larger depreciation in real terms, which tends to attenuate the fall in
the output gap.
Even though the output contraction is less acute, an inﬂation rate below the target allows the
monetary authority to respond more aggressively by a larger policy rate cut. The central bank
starts to increase the policy rate as inﬂation tends to return to its target and the output gap begins
to close. In contrast to the baseline scenario, the dynamics of inﬂation and the output gap do not
imply an important overshooting in these variables. That is, economic activity exhibits a more
stable path, which may be associated with a smaller welfare loss due to the adverse external shock.
These results suggest that a central bank that is credibly committed to provide an environment
of low and stable inﬂation over time can enjoy a higher margin of maneuver to respond to adverse
external shocks. In particular, it seems to be able to implement larger policy rate cuts that would
otherwise be possible without signiﬁcantly raising inﬂationary concerns. Furthermore, a credible
monetary policy framework should seek to eliminate the trade-oﬀ monetary authorities face when
assessing the appropriate policy response to an external shock that tends to depreciate the nom-
inal exchange rate. On the one hand, tightening monetary conditions would contain inﬂationary
pressures, but it may intensify the fall in output. On the other hand, a policy cut can contribute
to boost economic activity, but it may lead to a higher inﬂation rate.
In this setting, it can be argued that the higher degree of credibility that monetary authorities
can get with their actions aimed at maintaining inﬂation in line with their price stability objective,
not only contributes to the success of monetary policy in normal times, but also allows central bank
to respond more aggressively in times of crisis (Orphanides, 2010). Nevertheless, it is clear that
central banks’ credibility cannot be taken for granted. Thus, it must be permanently defended. In
particular, there is no better way to establish a good reputation than for economic agents to see
central banks delivering price stability over time.
Hence, one lesson from the crisis is that those institutional arrangements, such as central banks’
independence and a monetary policy focused on price stability, that have been successful in an-
choring inﬂation expectations and delivering an environment of low and stable inﬂation should be
9preserved.6 Otherwise, these institutions may lose the credibility gained by their favorable track
record in the last decades.
4.2 Experiment 2: Credible Fiscal Policy
The adoption of ﬁscal stimulus packages to attenuate the adverse impact of external shocks on
domestic economies has been an important issue in the policy debate, especially during the recent
international ﬁnancial crisis (Eyzaguirre et al. 2009). In particular, it can be argued that a sudden
reversal in capital ﬂows may lead to a sharp adjustment in domestic absorption, and consequently to
a severe economic recession. Under these circumstances, an expansionary ﬁscal policy can partially
oﬀset the contraction in private expenditures, and thus ameliorate the drop in economic activity.
Nevertheless, despite the above considerations, a relevant question is how to ﬁnance a ﬁscal
stimulus program precisely at a time when external borrowing is more expensive and consequently
there is a lesser access to international ﬁnancial markets. That is, authorities may be signiﬁcantly
constrained by limited access to ﬁnancing and, in many cases, given a weak ﬁscal position and high
public debt levels in the economy, a ﬁscal stimulus may not be feasible at all.
Furthermore, the mere intention to run an expansionary ﬁs c a lp o l i c ym a yh a v ea na d v e r s ee ﬀect
on ﬁnancial conditions and interest rates. For instance, the recent crisis has made clear that the
increases in ﬁscal deﬁcits and public debt to GDP ratios associated with the adoption of ﬁscal
stimulus packages can raise concerns about the long-run sustainability of ﬁscal policy, leading to an
even further increase in sovereign risk. This is particularly relevant since a widening in sovereign
spreads could reduce the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy to boost economic activity and preclude the
adoption of additional ﬁscal measures to support the economy.
These considerations are relevant for a number of emerging economies that experienced episodes
of ﬁscal dominance in the past and do not have a long history of sound ﬁscal policies. Moreover,
many times, in these economies temporary surges in government revenues, such as oil windfalls,
have been accompanied by sharp increases in public spending and external borrowing.7 Under
these circumstances, it is necessary a ﬁscal policy framework that allows authorities to save the
extraordinary resources associated with surges in ﬁscal revenues during economic expansions, and
to use them to ﬁnance expansionary policies during recessions.
A possibility is a structural balance ﬁscal rule. As mentioned, the structural balance removes
the cyclical component of ﬁscal revenues. Thus, a rule aimed at maintaining a balanced structural
budget over the business cycle would operate as an automatic stabilizer. For instance, whenever
6In light of the severity of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, currently there is a debate about the convenience of central
banks having a ﬁnancial stability objective besides their price stability mandate. Eﬀectively, central banks should
consider developments in the ﬁnancial sector when assessing the proper monetary policy stance, and may have to
adopt measures such as lengthening the monetary policy horizon in order to be able to take into account such
developments. However, this must not come at the cost of having a monetary authority less committed to price
stability.
7According to Lane and Tornell (1999), the lack of strong legal and political institutions in emerging economies led
to a “voracity eﬀect.” That is, in good times a windfall in ﬁscal revenues intensiﬁes the struggle for public resources
among interest groups, leading to an excessive expansion in public expenditures and wasting extraordinary revenues.
10ﬁscal revenues are above the level of ﬁscal income corresponding to potential output, the government
would run a ﬁscal surplus and accumulate assets. In turn, during economic contractions when
ﬁscal revenues are below the level consistent with the economy operating at its potential, the ﬁscal
authority will run a deﬁcit. In this way, this rule allows governments to run countercyclical ﬁscal
policies without raising concerns about the sustainability of ﬁscal accounts.
Figure 6 illustrates the dynamics of the policy rate, the output gap, inﬂation and the real
exchange rate when the economy is hit by a risk premium shock, for both the model with a
structural balance ﬁscal rule, and the baseline model, which can be interpreted as a model with
ab a l a n c e dﬁscal budget all the time. Since a structural balance ﬁscal rule implies a ﬁscal deﬁcit
whenever the output gap is negative, the ﬁscal authority automatically provides ﬁscal stimulus once
the adverse shock deteriorates economic activity. As a result, the output contraction is less severe.
More interestingly, instead of immediately relaxing monetary conditions, the central bank tem-
porarily increases the policy rate in order to contain the inﬂationary pressures related to the de-
preciation of the nominal exchange rate. Later, once inﬂation falls, the central bank relaxes the
monetary policy stance, supporting the ﬁscal authority in providing economic stimulus. Finally,
the output gap, inﬂation and the policy rate return to their initial levels.
These results may suggest that when an adverse shock, such as a sudden increase in risk pre-
mium, leads to both a negative output gap and an inﬂation rate above the target, the monetary
authority can concentrate on the inﬂation problem, while the ﬁscal authority implements a coun-
tercyclical policy aimed at attenuating the adverse impact on output. Furthermore, when inﬂation
is not a concern anymore, monetary policy can complement the economic stimulus provided by
the ﬁscal authority. That is, both authorities would move in the same direction, and contribute to
boost economic activity. In contrast to the baseline case, under the alternative, monetary policy
is less expansionary, which is compensated by a ﬁscal expansion. Finally, this policy mix seems to
be associated with a lower volatility in economic activity. That is, the use of two instruments in a
coordinated way, the monetary policy rate and the ﬁscal budget, contributes to the stabilization of
the economy.
4.3 Experiment 3: Initial Conditions Away from the Steady State
In the previous numerical exercises it was assumed that the economy was at its steady state when
the increase in the risk premium occurred. That is, inﬂation was at the central bank’s target and the
output gap was zero. However, it should be noted that an adverse external shock, such as a sudden
and sharp reversal in ﬁnancial inﬂows triggered by global factors, can take place independently of
the phase of the business cycle the domestic economy is going through. For instance, an economy
can be hit by an external shock at a time when the inﬂation rate is either above or below the
monetary authority’s target for inﬂation. Clearly, the policy response would be diﬀe r e n ti ne a c ho f
these two situations. Thus, the conditions prevailing in the economy when the sudden stop emerges
also aﬀect the scope to provide economic stimulus.
This sub section analyzes how initial conditions can inﬂuence central banks’ ability to respond
11to an episode of a sudden contraction in foreign ﬁnancing. Figure 7 depicts how the economy
evolves in two cases: when the initial inﬂation rate is above the central bank’s target, and when it
is equal to the target. The latter corresponds to the baseline model.
When the economy has a high initial inﬂation when it is hit by an increase in the risk premium,
the central bank is not able to relax monetary conditions immediately, even though the negative
shock leads to a negative output gap. Furthermore, given the high level of inﬂation, the central
bank increases the policy rate. Later, once inﬂation falls due to the output contraction and the
monetary policy tightening, the central bank implements policy rate cuts to support economic
activity. From that moment onward, the dynamics in both cases seems to be similar.
5F i n a l R e m a r k s
Volatile capital ﬂows is a feature of the global economy. In this setting, emerging market economies
have been subject to “sudden stops” in capital ﬂows, with negative consequences for economic
activity and ﬁnancial stability. In particular, these reversals in ﬁnancial ﬂows are associated with
real exchange depreciation, adjustments in domestic absorption, lower output, fall in asset prices
and credit contraction. In light of the recent episode of large capital ﬂows going to emerging
economies and the corresponding risk of an abrupt reversal in these ﬂows, which has become more
acute as a result of the European sovereign debt crisis, a relevant issue for emerging economies’
policymakers is how to cope with the negative impact of “sudden stops” episodes.
The recent experience of emerging markets economies during the global ﬁnancial crisis suggests
that those economies with better fundamentals were relatively less aﬀected by the adverse external
shocks, and were able to provide more monetary and ﬁscal stimulus. This paper presents a small-
scale macroeconomic model in order to rationalize the above issues. The model incorporates both
the possibility of a sudden reversal in capital ﬂows and ﬁscal policy rules, and provides a simple
analytical framework to study the policy response to adverse external shocks, such as “sudden
stops” in capital ﬂows. Through some numerical exercises we analyze the role of credible monetary
and ﬁscal policy frameworks in increasing policymakers’ degrees of freedom to provide economic
stimulus during episodes of ﬁnancial crisis.
On one hand, a higher degree of central bank’s credibility associated with a lower pass-through
from the nominal exchange rate to inﬂation, allows monetary authorities to implement larger policy
rate cuts in bad times. On the other hand, a ﬁscal policy framework that induces authorities to
save the extraordinary resources related to economic “booms” and to use them in bad times, allows
policymakers to run a countercyclical ﬁscal policy. The increased margin of maneuver to provide
monetary and ﬁscal stimulus leads to a more favorable evolution of economic variables. For instance,
there is a less severe economic contraction, and also lower output gap volatility.
Based on the above considerations, one lesson from the crisis is the importance of strong macro-
economic policy frameworks, which not only help maintain a stable macroeconomic environment in
normal times, but also allow authorities to provide more stimulus in times of ﬁnancial crisis. In this
12context, this paper represents a step forward in the analysis of the determinants of policymakers’
margin of maneuver to cope with negative foreign shocks.
The results in this paper can be interpreted as a ﬁrst step in the analysis of those factors
behind the increasing margin of maneuver to respond to external shocks, that some economies
enjoyed through the recent crisis. Eﬀectively, this study should be complemented with additional
work on these issues. In particular, more sophisticated models would allow a more detailed analysis
of the propagation of external shocks, and the policy response to them. A richer model would also
allow the analysis of other policy instruments such as macro-prudential measures.
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Appendix  
Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1 
a)  Current Account vs CDS Change            b) Inflation vs CDS Change 
Source: IMF, Bloomberg. 
Notes:  Countries included are: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
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Figure 2 
a)  Current Account vs Policy Rate Change b)  Inflation vs Policy Rate Change 
Source: IMF, Bloomberg. 
Notes: Countries included are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela [in figure a], Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Romania, Slovenia, China, India, Korea, 
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Figure 3 
a)  Public Sector Debt vs Fiscal Balance Change 
 
b)  Fiscal Balance vs Fiscal Balance  
Change 
Source: IMF, JP Morgan. 
Notes:  Countries included are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, 
Ukraine, Turkey, Slovakia, Slovenia, China,   India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, 
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Table 1: Parameter Values 
Phillips Curve
a1 0.25 Lag-Inflation
a2 0.25 Expected Inflation
a3 0.25 Output Gap
a4 0.25 Nominal Depreciation
IS Equation
b1 0.3 Lag Output Gap
b2 0.6 Expected Output Gap
b3 -0.04 Real Interest Rate
b4 0.7 Real Exchange Rate
b5 -3 Risk Premium
b6 -2 Fiscal Balance
Taylor Rule
c1 0.8 Lag Nominal Interest Rate
c2 1.5 Inflation
c3 1 Output Gap
Fiscal Rule




According to the parameter values for the Phillips curve, either a higher lag-inflation or a higher expected 
inflation tend to increase the current inflation rate. In the same way, an increase in the output gap and a 
nominal depreciation are associated with a higher inflation rate. As for the parameter values for the IS 
equation, an increase in either lag output gap or expected output gap, tend to increase current output gap. 
In turn, an increase in the real interest rate tends to decrease the output gap. A real exchange depreciation 
has a positive impact on the output gap, while an increase in the risk premium has a contractionary effect 
on output. Finally, increases in the fiscal surplus or decreases in the fiscal deficit are regarded as 
contractionary policies, that tend to reduce the output gap. Regarding the Taylor rule, a higher lag nominal 
interest rate is associated with a higher current nominal rate. Finally, the monetary authority responds to 
either an increase in inflation or in the output gap by increasing the policy rate.  
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Figure 4. Benchmark Model 
 
a)  Policy Rate b)  Output Gap 
c)  Inflation  d)  Risk Premium 
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Figure 5. Credible Monetary Policy 
 
a)  Policy Rate b)  Output Gap 
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Figure 6. Credible Fiscal Policy 
 
a)  Policy Rate b)  Output Gap 
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Figure 7. Initial High Inflation 
 
a)  Policy Rate b)  Output Gap 
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